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FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
Charles F. Barber t
The bearing of the antitrust laws on refusals to deal involves
questions of increasing practical importance.1 The question reaches
into everyday business operations of most firms, particularly in times
of shortages of supply. A refusal to deal, like the making of a contract,
is in itself an ordinary commercial act. It may reflect a firm's effort
to promote the legitimate development of the enterprise through the
intelligent selection of distribution outlets. A refusal to sell to a par-
ticular buyer may reflect poor credit, a history of unsatisfactory busi-
ness relations, contract obligations to another or a clash of personal-
ities. On the other hand, it takes no elaborate analysis to show that
a refusal to deal or threat to refuse to deal can be used effectively as
an economic weapon of persuasion, coercion or denial and applied to
the accomplishment of objectives prohibited by the antitrust laws.
Developing conspiracy and monopoly doctrines 2 together with an
appreciation of the coercive power of a refusal to deal have led to in-
creasing challenge and renewed judicial examination of the lawful
scope of one's freedom to select customers or suppliers under the anti-
t B.S. 1939, Northwestern University; LL.B. 1942, Harvard University; B. Phil.
1948, Oxford University; Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia.
1. Refusals to deal include both refusals to sell and refusals to buy. While most
of the cases challenging unilateral refusals to deal concern conduct of sellers, the
principles derived from these cases are equally applicable to refusals to buy. A re-
fusal includes not only an absolute refusal to do business, but also a refusal to do
business at the price and on the terms and conditions customary in the trade in
question. Threats to refuse to deal, at least those threats "which fall within the
common understanding of 'coercion"' as distinguished from "other practices for
which 'persuasion,' 'exposition' or 'argument' are fair characterizations" stand on the
same ground. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303, 317-18 (1948).
2. See text at p. 882 et seq.
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trust laws. One writer has intimated that this freedom has been so
circumscribed by the courts as to remain only as an "abstract" right,3
whereas another distinguished authority, writing in the same sympo-
sium, finds that in recent years, "the judicial pendulum has reversed its
swing" to uphold "the core of customer selection." ' The recent
Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws takes the position that refusals to deal, standing alone,
are "entirely legitimate" and that they acquire antitrust consequences
only when employed as an element in a course of conduct otherwise
unlawful.' It is timely, therefore, to make a detailed analysis of the
nature of refusals to deal and their relation to the antitrust laws.
REFUSAL TO SELL AS A FORM OF DISCRIMINATION
It takes a buyer and a seller to complete a sale. In addition to
the question of price, there is inherent in every transaction a willing-
ness on the part of each party to do business with the other.
In the case of an isolated transaction, the question of price and
the question of doing business with each other may be one and the
same. In a free economy, the seller's freedom not to sell and the
buyer's freedom not to buy are both essential elements in the price-
determining process. In this context, the seller's right to refuse to
sell is unqualified. Deprived of this freedom, some other form of
regulation would have to be provided to protect the seller's right in
his property.
In the case of an established market, however, the question of
price and the question of doing business with a particular customer are
more often separate questions. The price-bargain is made with the
market as a whole, and the question as to whom the product will be
offered at the price is separately determined. In this market context,
a refusal to sell is inescapably a form of economic discrimination. Some
customers are favored with sales, others are refused. If the effect of
a refusal to sell is analyzed against a theoretically perfect competitive
model, it may be shown to introduce distortions in the allocation of
resources not unlike those introduced by discriminations in price. But
to point out that a refusal to sell is a form of discrimination is not to
3. Timberg, Selection of Customers in How To COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 117 (1954); compare Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1121 (1949).
4. Austern, Dealing With Uncertainties in How TO COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST
Laws 343, 351 (1954). See also Gordon, Walking Backward into the Future in id.
at 47 n.7; Rifkind, Divisioan of Territories in id. at 136; Dean, Supervision of Selling
in id. at 226-29.
5. REPORT OF THE ATToRNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 132-37 (GPO 1955) (hereinafter cited as REPORT OF ATT'Y Gm.'s
COMM.).
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condemn it under the antitrust laws. The relevant antitrust question
relates to its purpose or effect, or both.
Except insofar as it may control the conduct of a monopolist, the
Sherman Act 6 does not reach refusals to sell which are arbitrary,
rather than purposeful. An arbitrary refusal can hardly be pursuant
to a conspiracy, for a conspiracy must have an object; nor can it be
reached as an attempt to monopolize, for the law here requires a show-
ing of specific intent.
It has been suggested that unilateral refusals to sell as such should
be subject to attack under Section 2 of the Clayton Act 7 as total dis-
criminations in price.' Since conspiracy is not an element of the con-
duct proscribed by Section 2, such an approach would bring within
the scope of judicial regulation any refusals to sell, including arbitrary
refusals, which are found to have the effect on competition proscribed
by the Act.
This view has not found favor in the courts. With exceptions
not here important, Section 2(a) applies to discriminations "in price
between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality."
This, the courts have held, means that prohibited discriminations can
occur only in the context of completed transactions where sales of like
commodities have in fact been made to different purchasers at different
prices. Similarly, charges that refusal to quote prices or to sell con-
stitutes discrimination in services or facilities prohibited by Section 2 (e)
6. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1952).
7. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
8. See Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1132-34 (1949).
9. Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939) (manufacturer
of electrical supplies refused to quote prices to former dealer but did quote prices
to competitor of dealer who bid on and was awarded contract); Naifah v. Ronson
Art Metal Works, Inc., CCH 1954 TRADE CAsEs 167,925 (10th Cir. 1954) (manu-
facturer of cigarette lighters discontinued sales to plaintiff when it commenced deal-
ing through a competing distributor); Sorrentino v. Glen-Gery Shale Brick Corp.,
46 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (brick manufacturer refused to continue to sell
to dealer pursuant to threat of another dealer in the area to withdraw its account
if manufacturer did not do so); A. J. Goodman & Son, Inc. v. United Lacquer
Mfg. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890 (D. Mass. 1949) (paint manufacturer quoted price to
dealer for bid on public tender and then itself submitted bid at lower price and was
awarded contract) ; see Note, 29 HAgv. L. Rv. 77 (1915) ; cf. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v.
American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 755 (1947); United States v. Borden Co., 111
F. Supp. 562, 580 (N.D. Ill. 1953). But cf. American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices,
187 F.2d 919, 924, 190 F.2d 73, 74 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Sidney Morris & Co. v. National
Ass'n of Stationers, Office Outfitters & Mfrs., 40 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1930).
Other decisions involving refusals to sell have dismissed complaints alleging
inter alia violations of § 2 without analysis of the point here under discussion. E.g.,
Abouaf v. J. D. & A. B. Spreckels Co., 26 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (no inter-
state commerce); Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824, 828
(D. Md. 1938) (point not reached since no showing of lessening of competition);
Nation9l Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299 Fed. 733 (2d Cir. 1924) (FTC order set aside) ;
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 224 Fed. 566 (S.D.N.Y.
1915) (preliminary injunction enoining refusal to sell denied) ; see Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. Jarrett, 42 F. Supp. 723, 734 (M.D. Ga. 1942).
1955]
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have failed,"0 as Section 2 (e) by its terms applies only to discrimina-
tions "in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser." The basis
of these decisions is that Congress intended Section 2 of the Clayton
Act to reach only completed transactions; it was designed to prevent
actual interference with the existing current of commerce and not to
require a trader to sell to any would-be customer at a nondiscriminatory
price merely because at the same time he is selling goods of like grade
to another customer at that price.
It may be noted that Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act contains
an express proviso:
.. . that nothing herein contained shall prevent persons en-
gaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from
selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not
in restraint of trade." "
This proviso recognizes that there is an area wherein refusals to sell
shall not be prohibited as discriminations in price; it also possibly
yields the negative implication that there are some refusals to sell,
i.e., those not in "bona fide transactions" and those "in restraint of
trade" which may be prohibited by Section 2(a). While the legis-
lative history of the proviso indicates some confusion as to the sig-
nificance of this qualifying language,' any notion that it was intended
10. Chicago Seating Co. v. S. Karpen & Bros., 177 F2d 863, 866 (7th Cir.
1949); Naifah v. Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc., CCH 1954 Trade Cas. 1167,925
(10th Cir. 1954); see Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331, 334 (3d
Cir. 1939).
11. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952). Note
that whereas in the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), the proviso is
contained in §2(a), it appears in the Code, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952), as a proviso to"sections 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27 of this title," that is, to the entire Clayton Act in-
cluding, for example, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952).
12. SEN. R P. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1914). The original House
bill contained the proviso without the qualifying language. See H. REP. No. 627,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1914). The latter was added by the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary which explained that the addition of the language "'in brna fide trans-
actions and not in restraint of trade,' . . . will enforce good faith and prevent
restraint of trade by this method." SEN. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 44
(1914). The proviso was not further discussed in either the House or the Senate
in 1914. Perhaps the Committee was taking care not to embrace within the proviso
selection of customers in concert with others or group boycotts. The simultaneous
comment of the Senate Committee in striking language of the House bill outlawing
arbitrary refusals to deal in certain basic industries, see note 165 infra, would
appear to preclude any suggestion of an intent to circumscribe the trade freedom
of sellers acting individually.
The proviso was retained without change in § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952). Representative Utterback inter-
preted the proviso as prohibiting a seller, once he had accepted a person as a customer,
"to refuse discriminatorily to sell to him particular distinctions of quality, grade
or brand." He added, "Nor does it permit absolute refusal to sell to particular
customers where the facts are such as to show that it is done for the purpose of
injuring or destroying them and that the elimination of their competition effects a
restraint of trade." 80 CONG. REc. 9418 (1936). Comments on the proviso in
the Senate were more general. Senator Patman explained: "Each manufacturer
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to reach certain refusals to sell encounters the objection that a proviso
ought not to be given affirmative content, and the courts have properly
so ruled.18
We may conclude, therefore, that Section 2 of the Clayton Act
does not reach refusals to sell, whether or not they substantially affect
competition, 4 and turn to a discussion of the cases which have arisen
under the Sherman Act, Section 3 of the Clayton Act 1 and Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.'6
REFUSAL TO SELL TO PRICE CUTTERS-NoN-STATUTORY RESALE
PRICE MAINTENANCE
Most discussions of refusals to deal begin with the classic state-
ment of the rule in the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court in
the Colgate case.' 7 There the Court, after referring to defendant's
contention of "the manufacturer's undoubted right to specify resale
prices and refuse to deal with anyone who failed to maintain the
same," 18 stated:
"The purpose of the Sherman Act is . . to preserve the
right of freedom to trade. In the absence of any purpose to create
or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recog-
nized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely pri-
vate business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as
must treat his customers fairly and not discriminate between them. Under existing
law (which is not changed by this bill) a manufacturer has the right to select his
customers. But having selected, he is not permitted to discriminate between them."
Id. at 5728. Compare PATMAx, THE ROBINSoN-PATmA.N Acr 151 (1938) ("A seller
shall not refuse to sell, or to select customers, where the effect restrains trade.").
See 80 CONG. REc. 6333, 8124 (1936) ; 40 COL. L. Rnv. 157 (1940).
13. See cases cited in notes 9, 10 supra.
14. But cf. REPoRT OF ArT'Y GEN.'s Comm. 135. In its discussion of refusals
to deal under the Clayton Act, the report states that a "refusal to accord propor-
tionally equal treatment to an already established customer may be a violation
of the 'allowances' or 'services' provisions" of §-2(e), citing, e.g., Corn Products
Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 743-44 (1945). This is correct on analysis, but
confusing in that it suggests that the refusal has something to do with the violation.
In the situation noted, proof of the discriminatory sales and not of the refusal to
sell, makes out the violation of § 2(e). The report further states, without supporting
analysis, that refusals to sell are "ordinarily" exempt from § 2 (a). REPORT OF
ATr'y GEN.'s COMM. 135 n.27. The qualifying adverb perhaps reflects a nod toward
the Fifth Circuit opinions in Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 187 F.2d
919, 924 (5th Cir.), modified and rehearing denied, 190 F.2d 73, 74 (5th Cir.
1951) which insofar as they hold a refusal to quote a non-discriminatory price on a
particular item to be a violation of §2(a), are, for reasons stated in the text, in-
correctly decided.
15. 38 STAT. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952).
16. 38 STAT. 719, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §45 (Supp. 1954).
17. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
18. Id. at 306.
19S51
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to parties with whom he will deal. And, of course, he may an-
nounce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse
to sell." 19
The Colgate case has been much criticized and much misunder-
stood. It stands for the principle that, absent monopoly, unilateral
refusals to deal are lawful, notwithstanding the fact that the intended
and actual result of the refusals to deal would be unlawful if accom-
plished by agreement. As such, the decision stands unqualified, as
shall be explained in detail, by more recent developments in the anti-
trust laws. It is only the gloss of the decision-the unwarranted im-
plication that restrictive schemes implemented by refusals to deal enjoy
some sort of immunity under the antitrust laws-which has been
eroded.
The indictment charged, inter alia, that Colgate had engaged in a
combination with its dealers to maintain resale prices named by the
company in that dealers were urged to observe the prices on pain of
losing their supply, dealers were urged to and did report any sales
by others at different prices, assurances of future compliance were
secured from reported price cutters and the company uniformly refused
to sell to those who failed to give such assurances.20  The trial court
dismissed the indictment as failing to charge a violation of law. The
Supreme Court considered itself bound by the interpretation given
to the indictment by the trial court; thus the only problem before the
Court was "to ascertain . . . what interpretation the trial court
placed upon the indictment-not to interpret it ourselves." 21 The
gloss of the decision arose from the fact that the Supreme Court did
not conclude that the trial court had interpreted the indictment to
charge a violation of the Sherman Act. The trial court had plainly
said that the indictment charged Colgate with entering into a combina-
tion with its wholesale and retail customers, because it agreed with
them upon prices at which its products might be resold.22 Inasmuch as
the Supreme Court had long since held price maintenance agreements
unlawful under the Sherman Act ' and had further held that the agree-
ment necessary to make out a violation could be inferred from con-
19. Id. at 307. Earlier cases in the lower courts to the same effect include,
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir.
1915); Union Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173 Fed. 737 (8th Cir. 1909);
Baran v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 256 Fed. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1919). But cf.
United States v. Keystone Watch Case Co., 218 Fed. 502 (E.D Pa. 1915), appeal
di, nissed, 257 U.S. 664 (1921).
20. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 302-03 (1919).
21. Id. at 306.
22. Id. at 304.
23. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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duct of the parties,24 a decision sustaining the indictment would seem
to have been required. But the Court instead focused on the further
statement of the trial court that purchasers from Colgate were free
to sell what they had purchased at any price they chose, and concluded,
albeit with "some serious doubts," 25 that as interpreted by the trial
court the indictment had failed to charge an agreement bringing the
conduct within the ambit of the Sherman Act.
Just nine months later, in United States v. A. Schrader's Son,
Inc., 6 the Court spelled out in unmistakable terms the nature of its
holding in Colgate. A district court, citing Colgate, had dismissed
an indictment charging that defendants had entered into contracts for
the maintenance of resale prices. Mr. Justice McReynolds, who had
written the Colgate opinion, rather impatiently pointed out that Col-
gate had plainly declared that the Court was concerned only with the
interpretation made by the trial court of the indictment and, in re-
versing, spoke of
"the obvious difference between the situation presented when a
manufacturer merely indicates his wishes concerning prices and
declines further dealings with all who fail to observe them, and
one where he enters into agreements-whether express or im-
plied from a course of dealing or other circumstances-with all
customers throughout the different States which undertake to
bind them to observe fixed resale prices." 27
Price maintenance agreements previously had been held unlawful under
the Sherman Act in the Dr. Miles case.28 There was nothing in
Colgate which qualified the Dr. Miles rule; the hope which may have
been entertained by some of reading into Colgate any such qualifica-
tion might well have died with Schrader.
In the Beech-Nut case,29 decided three years after Colgate, the
Supreme Court had before it a price maintenance scheme under which
Beech-Nut secured the cooperation of its distributors in keeping sup-
plies from price cutters by means not unlike those charged in Colgate.
In the Beech-Nut case, however, which was brought under Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Court reached the question
of the inferences to be drawn from the facts, and had no difficulty in-
24. Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522, 534 (1915) ; Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914). This principle was stressed
in the Government's brief, Brief for Petitioner, pp. 12-16, United States v. Colgate
& Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
25. 250 U.S. at 306.
26. 252 U.S. 85 (1920);
27. Id. at 98-99.
28. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
29. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
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ferring from this cooperation the agreement essential to making out
a violation of law."0 But, in line with Colgate, it directed that the
Commission's order, which had, inter alia, directed Beech-Nut to cease
and desist from refusing to sell to distributors who failed to adhere
to the resale prices, be modified to prohibit such refusals to sell only
when pursuant to "cooperative methods in which the respondent and
its distributors, customers and agents undertake to prevent others from
obtaining the company's products at less than the prices designated
by it." 31
The problem reached the Supreme Court again in 1944 in the
Bausch & Lomb case. 2 Confronted by a resale price maintenance
scheme enforced by refusal to sell to non-cooperating retailers, it had
no difficulty in implying the essential conspiracy. Following the Beech-
Nut case, it found "more . . . than mere acquiescence of whole-
salers in Soft-Lite's published resale price list." ' But while it
held the resulting conspiracy and combination unlawful, the Court re-
fused to extend the decree, as requested by the Government, to require
Soft-Lite to undertake to " 'sell its product, without discrimination, to
any person offering to pay cash therefor.' " 34
In asking for this blanket provision, the Government had argued
that Soft-Lite could avoid the effect of the decree simply by selling
only to customers it knew would cooperate in a distribution scheme of
30. Id. at 454-55. The Court referred to the Colgate case, noted that "the
essential agreement . . . might be implied from a course of dealing," id. at 452, and
held the Beech-Nut system unlawful because it went "far beyond the simple refusal
to sell goods to persons who will not sell at stated prices, which in the Colgate case
was held to be within the legal right of the producer." Id. at 454.
31. Id. at 455-56. The pertinent provisions of the FTC order are quoted in the
opinion. Id. at 444 n.1.
Similarly, the lower courts, while frequently reiterating the freedom of a
trader acting individually to refuse to sell, have repeatedly held systems of resale
price maintenance implemented by refusals to sell to price cutters unlawful under
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act or § 1 of the Sherman Act whenever
customer participation was sufficient to support a finding of agreement or combina-
tion between the seller and his customers to maintain resale prices. Connecticut
Importing Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 129 F.2d 651 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 664 (1942); Shakespeare Co. v. FTC, 50 F.2d 758 (6th Cir. 1931);
Q.RLS. Music Co. v. FTC, 12 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1926); Moir v. FTC, 12 F.2d 22
(1st Cir. 1926) ; Hills Bros. v. FTC, 9 F.2d 481 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 270 U.S.
662 (1926); Cream of Wheat Co. v. FTC, 14 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1926) (FTC order
modified); Toledo Pipe-Threading Machine Co. v. FTC, 11 F.2d 337 (6th Cir.
1926). Cf. Harriet Hubbard Ayer, Inc. v. FTC, 15 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1926) (no
violation), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 759 (1927); American Tobacco Co. v. FTC, 9
F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1925) (no violation), aff'd, 274 U.S. 543 (1927) ; United States v.
Hudnut, 8 F.2d 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1925) (Sherman Act-no violation). See Chafee,
Equitable Servitudes osn Chattels, 41 HARv. L. Rzv. 945, 991 (1928); Note, 27
COL. L. Rrv. 183 (1927).
32. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
33. Id. at 723.
34. Id. at 728.
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the sort which the Court there held unlawful. In rejecting this argu-
ment, the Court said:
"Congress has been liberal in enacting remedies to enforce
the anti-monopoly statutes. But in no instance has it indicated
an intention to interfere with ordinary commercial practices. In
a business, such as Soft-Lite, which deals in a specialty of a
luxury or near-luxury character, the right to select its customers
may well be the most essential factor in the maintenance of the
highest standards of service. We are, as the District Court ap-
parently was, loath to deny to Soft-Lite this privilege of selec-
tion." 11
In a more questionable decision,36 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit refused to allow the defense of illegality under the anti-
trust laws in a suit for rescission of a contract on the ground that the
importer had failed to carry out provisions of the contract which
required him "to maintain the price and to limit the number of dis-
tributors." 17 A majority of the court held that the evidence did not
indicate the presence of an agreement between the importer and his
customers to fix resale prices, and approved the contract, citing the
Colgate case:
"There are legitimate means of price maintenance in spite
of the provisions of the Sherman Act. . . . Such means include
a refusal to sell in the future to those who had not maintained a
suggested price." "
While emphasizing the fact that refusals to sell confer no special
antitrust immunity on the course of conduct of which they form a part,
the Supreme Court has continued to cite Colgate with approval.39
35. Id. at 728-29. More recently, the Supreme Court has approved, as a "recog-
nized remedy," compulsory sale provisions in a contested decree. Besser Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 343 U.S. 444, 447 (1952).
36. Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge Distributing Co., 189 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.
1951).
37. Id. at 914.
38. Id. at 916. Judge Frank filed a vigorous dissent. If something more than
a bare refusal to sell were required, he would have found it in the existence of a
general program by the seller of cutting off price cutters, in the further agreement
to limit the number of distributors of its products or in the importer's promise to
adhere to that program. Id. at 924. The latter element would seem sufficient to
support a finding of the essential "agreement."
39. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953);
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951). But cf. Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). In the
course of his opinion for the Court holding unlawful a combined refusal to sell to
dealers who resold at prices above suggested maximum resale prices, Mr. Justice
Black made an obvious reference to the Colgate doctrine when he said: "Seagram
and Calvert acting individually perhaps might have refused to deal with petitioner
or with any or all of the Indiana wholesalers." Id. at 214 (italics added). This
caveat was probably prompted by the argument in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 34(
19551
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Of course one would not advise a seller that he could effectively
enforce resale price maintenance by cutting off price cutters. Resale
price maintenance schemes enforced by refusals to sell to price cutters
enjoy no special immunity under the antitrust laws. Apart from stat-
utory resale price maintenance, 40 any systematic refusal to sell to
dealers, who do not maintain suggested resale prices, which is made
known to the trade would inevitably raise serious questions under the
antitrust laws; the implementation of any such policy, without giving
rise to facts sufficient to support a finding of unlawful agreement or
combination or of something more than a "mere acquiescence" of
dealers in published price lists, may be impossible. It is the scheme
as a whole which is declared unlawful, not the act of refusing to sell
to any particular customer. Since resale price maintenance agreements
are unlawful per se, it is appropriate that the courts should look care-
fully for evidence of that agreement with customers which is required
to make out a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
On the other hand, a seller should remain free to discontinue sales
to an otherwise unsatisfactory dealer who happens to be a price cutter
and is known as such." Any other rule would permit a dealer about
U.S. 231 (1951), which was before the Court at the same time and decided the
following week. The Standard Oil case involved the validity of an FTC order pro-
hibiting Standard from selling gasoline to wholesalers who resold such gasoline to
retailer customers at less than Standard's posted prices to its own retailer customers.
On review, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit lipheld the order with
minor modifications. 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949). Judge Minton, writing for the
Court of Appeals, observed that this did not compel price maintenance unlawful
under the Sherman Act since, to comply with the order, Standard need only "govern
its own conduct" and refuse to sell to price-cutting wholesalers. Id. at 217. In
the Supreme Court, Standard argued that no seller "in his right mind" familiar with
the antitrust laws would attempt to enforce such a resale price maintenance system.
Brief for Petitioner, pp. 46-47. The FTC disagreed, citing Colgate. Brief for Re-
spondent, p. 71. On oral argument, Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggested that Colgate"was rather under a cloud." See 18 U.S.L. W= 3211 (U.S. 1950). The Supreme
Court decided the case on other grounds and did not consider the merits of the
order. See Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look
at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 942-44 (1951).
40. The conclusions stated in the text are relevant to the legality of attempts
to extend the effect of the "fair trade" laws by refusals to sell. Of course, refusals
to sell to persons who refuse to make contracts specifically authorized by the
McGuire Act, 66 STAT. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. §45(a) (1) (Supp. 1954), amending
§5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), and by the relevant
state legislation would be unexceptionable. The condition of sale in such cases-
the making of a lawful resale price maintenance contract-is a lawful condition.
But this is a narrow exception to the general rule. The McGuire Act gives no
immunity to price maintenance schemes enforced by refusals to sell which do not
come within the specifically authorized statutory scheme. Cf. Schwegmann Bros. v.
Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 381, 398-403
(1952). It would not condone concerted refusal to sell to persons who refuse to
execute fair trade contracts, cf. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324
U.S. 293 (1945), or refusal pursuant to agreement with other distributors to sell to
customers who cut prices. Connecticut Importing Co. v. Continental Distilling
Corp., 129 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1942); cf. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
41. Cf. Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1954).
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to be dropped because he does not adequately represent the seller to
ensure the continuation of his dealer status simply by notoriously cut-
ting prices. Such a result would be inconsistent with the preservation
of market freedom to which the antitrust laws are dedicated.
Analytically, this dichotomy based on the seller's motive may be
clear. But as a practical matter, the antitrust risk of cutting off a
price-cutting dealer is great, particularly where most of the other dealers
-as will normally be the case-follow the price policy suggested by the
seller. Of course, the risk may be reduced by building up a record
which demonstrates that the particular dealer does not adequately
represent the seller, but the possible inference from other facts of com-
bination or conspiracy between the seller and his other dealers to en-
force resale price maintenance will always be present. Still common
sense and judicial regard for the requirements of business can probably
safely be relied on to exclude from the impact of the price maintenance
cases those situations where a refusal to sell to a price-cutting customer
represents no more than a warranted shift in distribution arrangements.
UNILATERAL REFUSALS TO DEAL FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN
CONTROLLING RESALE PRICES
In the ordinary flow of commerce, refusals to deal by individual
firms occur in contexts not involving resale price maintenance. While
most of the cases under this heading have arisen in connection with the
policing by the seller of his distribution system, the principles concerned
apply equally to attempts by a trader to control the use of the product
sold or attempts to coerce other conduct of the buyer or seller.
Absent conspiracy or monopoly, the cases indicate that an in-
dividual has full freedom to refuse to sell to or buy from any person
for any reason. The cases range from situations of inherent anti-
trust interest, such as exclusive dealing ' or the enforcement of terri-
42. Leo J. Meyberg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp., 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954) (refusal to sell to dealer who refused to deal
exclusively in seller's product) ; Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954) (refusal to renew franchise of Hudson
dealer who also had Willys dealership) ; Nelson Radio & Supply v. Motorola, Inc.,
200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953) (wholesale distribu-
tor's franchise for Motorola radios cancelled when he refused to abandon demand
that he be permitted to handle communication equipment manufactured by Motorola
or, in the alternative, acquired from other manufacturers); Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola
Co., 155 F2d 99 (3d Cir. 1946) (distributor cut off by Pepsi-Cola when he refused
to discontinue handling other non-alcoholic beverages) ; Journal of Commerce Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tribune Co., 286 Fed. 111 (7th Cir. 1922) (refusal to sell newspapers
to independent carriers who handle Chicago Journal of Commerce); United States
v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856, 867-68 (D. Minn. 1951) (some dealers who
handled or took on competing lines or who failed to carry full line of seller cut off) ;
Camfield Mfg. Co. v. McGraw Elec. Co., 70 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1947) (refusal
to sell "Toastmaster"' to distributors who handled plaintiff's electric toasters) ; see
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torial restrictions on sales outlets,4 to situations where the reason for
the refusal suggested less well-established categories of antitrust prob-
lems ' or where the reason was obscure and it appeared that the dealer
was cut off because his services were deemed unsatisfactory. 45 Sim-
ilarly, unilateral refusals to buy, absent conspiracy or monopoly, have
been held free of antitrust condemnation under a variety of circum-
stances. 6 The reason for the refusal to deal in these cases was un-
important. What was crucial was the failure of the plaintiff to allege
or prove the requisite contract, conspiracy, monopoly-or unlawful sales-
on-condition to bring the questioned conduct within the ambit of the
antitrust laws.
Of cotjrse, antitrust questions would arise in such cases, absent
monopoly, only where the conduct, if pursuant to contract or agree-
Dublin Distributors, Inc. v. Edward and John Burke, Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 125, 127-28
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (franchise of distributor of Guinness Stout who commenced dealing
with imported Beamish Irish Stout cancelled when he refused to discontinue handling
the latter).
43. Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 37 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y.
"1941), aff'd, 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.), rehearing denied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943). See Rifkind, Division of Territories in How
TO COMPLY WITH THE ANTrrUST LAWS 127, 132, 136 (1954).
44. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S.
537 (1954) (refusal to sell first-run films to theater not in downtown area) ; Moore
v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926) (New York Cotton Exchange
refused to authorize sale of its market quotations to the Odd-Lot Cotton Exchange,
some of the members of which it suspected of unlawful "bucket shop" operations) ;
Johnson v. J. H. Yost Lumber Co., 117 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1941) (refusal intended
to preserve the good will of another customer who was a competitor of the person
refused); G. & P. Amusement Co. v. Regent Theater Co., 107 F. Supp. 453 (N.D.
Ohio 1952), aff'd, 216 F.2d 749 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 23 U.S.L. WEEx
3251 (U.S. April 12, 1955) (same); Windsor Theatre Co. v. Walbrook
Amusement Co., 94 F. Supp. 388 (D. Md. 1950), af'd, 189 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1951)
(same); Sorrentino v. Glen-Gery Shale Brick Corp., 46 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa.
1942) (same) ; Green v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 132 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1942),
cert. dismissed, 319 U.S. 777 (1943) (refusal to sell parts to dealer who rebuilt and
sold traded-in and junked vacuum cleaners) ; National Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299 Fed.
733 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 613 (1924) (refusal to grant discounts
for pooled orders of individual merchants equivalent to discounts allowed
on similar purchases by chain stores) ; Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 262 U.S. 759 (1923) (refusal to sell at wholesale price to retailer
cooperatives) ; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 Fed.
46 (2d Cir. 1915) (refusals to sell to other than wholesalers) ; Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix
Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1938) (refusal to sell to distributor in order
to coerce distributor to buy up or sell out to another distributor). Cf. Green v.
Victor Talking Machine Co., 24 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1928) (action in tort by distributor
cut off when it refused to sell stock in itself to defendant manufacturer).
45. Shotkin v. General Elec. Co., 171 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1948); Feddersen
Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1950); Riedley v. Hudson Motor
Car Co., 82 F. Supp. 8 (W.D. Ky. 1949); Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Pub-
lishing Co., 127 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
46. FTC v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924) (refusal of whole-
saler to buy from manufacturer who sold to third firm which was 10% in the
wholesale business and 90% in the retail trade without paying jobber's profit to
wholesaler upheld under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act) ; United States
v. Minneapolis Elec. Contractors Ass'n, CCH 1954 TRADE CAs. 167,737 (D. Minn.
1954) (refusal of wholesaler to buy from manufacturer who sold directly to con-
sumers). The conduct coerced by threats to refuse to buy, such as the grant of
discriminatory prices, may independently encounter antitrust condemnation. Cf.
Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
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ment, was of the sort which unreasonably restrained trade or sub-
stantially affected competition. Exclusive dealing, territorial dealer
franchises, and the exercise of control over customers to develop and
protect the seller's good will in his product are not per se unlawful. If
control of customer conduct would be lawful if accomplished by con-
tract, refusal to deal with customers who fail to so conduct themselves
would a fortiori be unexceptionable. In such cases, the refusals to sell
involve no novel issues requiring examination here.
The question remains whether coercion of conduct, which would be
unlawful if the subject of contract, is free of antitrust condemnation if
accomplished by threats of refusal to deal and refusals to deal with
offending customers or suppliers. It is in this situation that sharp con-
flict arises between the policy of the antitrust laws in eliminating un-
reasonable restraints on trade and the policy of the general law in
preserving the freedom of a trader acting unilaterally to develop his
business according to his personal judgment.
The theoretical problem is identical to that encountered in the
price maintenance cases, and its solution is probably governed by those
cases. On the one hand, something more than mere acquiescence in the
seller's offending policy would be required to support a finding of the
existence of that agreement or understanding essential, in the absence
of monopoly, to making out a violation of the antitrust laws. On
the other hand, common sense compels the conclusion that a producer
should remain free to discontinue business relations with individual
distributors or dealers who are not doing an effective job of selling,
whether this ineffectiveness results from business ineptitude or from
the fact that the dealer has diluted his efforts by handling competing
lines, or the fact thdt his activities derogate from the public good will
attaching to the producer or his product.4 7 It is of the essence of com-
petition that the manufacturer or wholesaler should and does have wide
freedom in maintaining the quality of his distribution system.
The concern of some antitrust lawyers following the Standard
Oil of California48 decision, that one would have to tread warily in
47. Cf. United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856, 863 (D. Minn. 1951):
"A farm machinery manufacturer must have independent discretion as to any person
or concern which it will designate as a dealer. If a dealer is handling competitive
lines to the detriment of Case, for instance, sound business permits it to withdraw
and look for another dealer. The suggestion was made in argument by plaintiff's
counsel that a dealer has the inherent right to handle as many lines as he desires
regardless of the consequences to him business-wise. Granted, but he has no right
to require the manufacturer to fail with him. Surely, where a dealer is so wedded to
a competitive line that Case is a mere stepchild in the dealer's family, there can be
no restriction upon the right of Case to look for another business home in the
community."
48. Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). The
Court there held that the competitive effect requirement of § 3 of the Clayton Act was
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cutting off any dealer who accounted for a not insignificant volume of
business and who took on a competing line, has not been borne out by
the recent cases.4 9  Indeed, treble damage suits brought by cut-off
dealers have uniformly failed."0 Perhaps because dealers do not have
as great an interest in policing activities of other dealers outside the
field of price maintenance, the courts have not been inclined to infer
conspiracy between the manufacturer and others in his distribution
system to bring a refusal to sell to a cut-off dealer within the principle
of the group boycott cases."' As between the seller and the cut-off
dealer, there remains no element of agreement to bring the refusal
within the scope of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, nor is there a sale-
on-condition to invoke the prohibitions of Section 3 of the Clayton Act.
The latter applies only to executed transactions. It outlaws certain
sales-on-condition and not refusals to sell.52
In a suit brought by the Government, however, a refusal to sell
to a dealer who takes on or handles a competing line may tend to es-
tablish that sales to other dealers are being made on the condition or
understanding that they shall not deal in competing lines, such as to
make out a violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act or Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act. In the absence of express con-
tract, proof of the actual use of such sanctions would tend to dis-
satisfied "simply by proof that a substantial portion of commerce is affected" and
that it need not be shown that "competitive activity has actually diminished or
probably will diminish" (id. at 299). More recent decisions suggest that the Court
may have retreated somewhat from this position. Compare Times-Picayune Publish-
ing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) ; FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising
Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953). See REPORT OF ATT'y GEN.'S COMM. 141 et Seq.
49. Compare Austern, Incrnsistencies in the Law in BUSINESS PRACTICES UNDER
THE FEDERAL. ANTITRUST LAWS 158, 162 (1951) and his later comment when the
article was republished under the title Dealing wifh Uncertainties in How To CoMPLY
WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 343, 351 (1954).
50. See cases cited in notes 42 and 45 supra.
51. But see, e.g., Emich Motors Corp v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558,
rehearing denied, 341 U.S. 906 (1951) (§ 1 complaint based on conspiracy between
General Motors and a wholly owned subsidiary). Compare cases cited note 153
infra. See discussion on group boycott beginning at p. 872 infra.
52. E.g., Leo J. Meyberg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp., 215 F.2d 100 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola,
Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); cf. Hudson
Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 269 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954).
See Hunter Douglas Corp. v. Lando Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 372, 376 (9th Cir.
1954). But see Dublin Distributors, Inc. v. Edward and John Burke, Ltd., CCH
1952-1953 Trade Cas. 67,477 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (motion to dismiss count in
complaint by distributor cut off charging violation of § 3 denied); 53 COL. L. Rv.
874 (1953); 28 N.Y.U.L.Q. 1170 (1953).
The rationale of the Motorola and Meyberg cases is that the cut-off dealer
was not injured by a sale-on-condition but rather by the absence of a sale, a situation
not covered by the terms of § 3. This strict construction of § 3 as applicable only
to executed transactions is consistent with the construction given by the courts to
§ 2 of the Clayton Act which has been held to apply only to completed sales to
purchasers and not to refusals to sell. See cases cited notes 9, 10 supa. See also
REPORT OF Ar'y GEN.'S Comm. 136 n.28.
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tinguish possibly unlawful exclusive dealing from situations where
dealers of their own free choice handle exclusively the seller's line.'
Similarly, refusal to sell a particular product or a component of such
product, except in combination with another product, may be relevant
in establishing coerced purchases in combination, or tying sales, subject
to attack under the same provisions of the antitrust laws.54
The recent Times-Picayune "' case must be noted because Mr.
Justice Clark included in his opinion for the Court an essay on refusals
to sell. That case involved the legality, under Sections 1 and 2 51
of the Sherman Act, of the Times-Picayune's policy of selling certain
advertising in its morning and evening papers only under a contract re-
quiring the advertiser to advertise in both papers. Mr. Justice Clark
first examined the unit contract itself under Section 1 and, finding
neither unlawful purpose nor effect, held the contract reasonable and
not unlawful. He then considered the question whether "refusal to sell
advertising space except en bloc, viewed alone, constitutes a violation
of the Act." 57 This discussion appears gratuitous, for if the con-
dition included in the contract is lawful, the refusal to sell pursuant to
the condition would necessarily also be lawful. The discussion is of
interest, however, in that the Court reaffirmed once more that "re-
fusals to sell, without more, do not violate the law." 58 The contracts
themselves being lawful and not a part of an otherwise unlawful scheme,
Section 1 of the Sherman Act did not reach them.
In summary, absent monopoly, any practical limitations on a
trader's freedom unilaterally to refuse to deal for non-price reasons
stem not from the refusal to deal but from the bearing of the refusal
on some other conduct of the seller which may be subject to questiom
under the antitrust laws. The antitrust significance of a refusal to
sell to a particular customer must be found in the seller's overall scheme
53. Compare Carter Carburator Corp. v. FTC, 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940),
United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 618 (1941), United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.
Cal. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 922 (1953), with United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101
F. Supp. 856, 863, 867-68 (D. Minn. 1951). See Ford Motor Co. v. United States,
335 U.S. 313,.316 n.3 (1948).
54. Compare Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953) (combination sales held not unlawful), United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156-59 (1948) (block booking of copyrighted motion
pictures held unlawful), with United States v. Kohler Co., CCH 1952-1953 TRADE
CAS. 11167,453, 67,553 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (alleged tie-in selling not established where
proof did not show refusal to sell items separately).
55. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), 102
U. OF PA. L. REv. 125 (1953).
56. See text at p. 865 infra.
57. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 624-25
(1953).
58. Id. at 625.
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of distribution. If a refusal to deal is used as an instrument of anti-
trust violation, it may come within the proscriptions of those laws, but
not otherwise. The refusal to deal itself, if not pursuant to agreement
or monopoly, is unexceptionable.
LIMITATIONS ON A TRADER'S INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM TO REFUSE TO
DEAL UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
In recent years, the courts have been exploring the availability of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act as a route to judicial control of busi-
ness activities, including refusals to deal, of individual firms. This use
of Section 2 to reach unilateral refusals to deal was forecast in the
early cases. The classic statement of the right to refuse to deal in the
Colgate case, for example, is qualified as obtaining "in the absence of
any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly," " and this theme runs
through subsequent cases upholding refusals to deal.' Similarly,
where a policy of refusing to deal with a particular customer or par-
ticular class of trade or with particular suppliers except on condition
has been employed as an element in an over-all monopolistic scheme,
the policy of refusing to deal has been held unlawful along with the
rest of the scheme.6 1
The first case testing the legality of a refusal to deal as such
under Section 2, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials
Co.,' arose in the aftermath of the Government's successful monopoly
case against the Eastman Kodak Company."
Plaintiff, an established Kodak dealer, was cut off from supplies
after Kodak had acquired control of a supply house competing with
plaintiff and had unsuccessfully attempted to purchase plaintiff's busi-
ness. Plaintiff alleged that this refusal was in pursuance of monopoly,
Kodak having attempted to monopolize trade in photographic supplies,
inter alia, by acquiring control of competing manufacturers and the
businesses of wholesalers and dealers. Its allegations with respect
to Kodak's intent to monopolize and as to specific predatory practices
59. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
60. E.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953);
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926); FTC v. Raymond
Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924); FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 428 (1920).
61. E.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) ; Schine Chain Theatres,
Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948) ; American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781 (1946) ; Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936);
United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.
1949) ; United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) ; United States v. American Can Co.,
87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
62. 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
63. United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 Fed. 62 (W.D.N.Y. 1915), decree
sigiwd, 230 Fed. 522 (1916), appeal dismissed, 255 U.S. 578 (1921).
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were supported by the final decree in the Government's monopoly suit,
which was received in evidence at the trial. Judgment was for plain-
tiff and the Supreme Court affirmed. "Although there was no direct
evidence . . that the defendant's refusal to sell to the plaintiff was
in pursuance of a purpose to monopolize, we think that the circum-
stances disclosed in the evidence sufficiently tended to indicate such
purpose . . . to warrant the submission of this question to the
jury." 64
Southern Photo Materials involved no novel application of Sec-
tion 2. The prohibited attempt to monopolize or monopolization being
founded on conduct separate and apart from the refusal to sell in issue,
it was necessary only to connect the refusal to sell to the illegal course
of conduct to establish plaintiff's right to relief.6 5
More troublesome are the cases involving refusals to sell by a
person in the position of sole supplier of a particular customer or
class of customers. We will assume that, but for the refusal to sell,
the position of the supplier as sole supplier in the market, as defined,
is not subject to attack under Section 2. Every manufacturer is the
sole supplier of products of his own manufacture, and the object of
his business activity is to develop and maintain customer preference
for his products. Under what circumstances, if any, does Section 2
place on one who produces for sale a duty to sell to all customers
or to any particular customer? We may note at the outset that suc-
cessful selling always has the effect of limiting pro tanto the oppor-
tunities of the seller's competitors to sell competitive products to the
same customers.
The first and perhaps still most extreme case in this area is United
States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc.66  The district court there held
a unilateral refusal by the only manufacturer of linen rugs to sell to
a distributor in order to prevent that distributor from selling linen
rugs to the United States Government in competition with the manu-
facturer was unlawful under Section 2 as an attempt "to monopolize
the sale of linen rugs in interstate commerce to the United States."
The court explicitly found that Klearflax's position as sole producer
of linen rugs was not due to any unlawful practices. Moreover, the
64. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 375
(1927).
65. See Greenleaf v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 79 F. Supp. 362, 365 (E.D.
Pa. 1947) : "A combination may be liable for acts, but for the fact that it is con-
ducting an illegal monopoly, it could perform with impunity. Thus an illegal
monopoly cannot discriminate against or refuse to deal with a person without
sufficient cause." Cf. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558
(1951).
66. 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945).
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court found that linen rugs, while they had certain distinctive features,
were in active competition with rugs of other materials, some of which,
to varying degrees, possessed qualities not unlike those of linen rugs.
Klearflax's annual production of $1,000,000 comprised less than one-
half of one percent of the total rug business in the United States.
Klearflax sold its rugs through distributors, jobbers and retail
stores as well as directly to users. While there were no restrictions on
the distributors bidding on Government tenders, Klearflax itself had
customarily sold directly to the United States Government. A con-
troversy between Klearflax and one of its distributors arose when
the latter underbid Klearflax on a Government tender. Klearflax,
under Government pressure, supplied the rugs to its distributor for
this order. When the incident was repeated, Klearflax effectively re-
moved the distributor from competition for this business by reducing
his status to that of jobber, in which classification he was entitled to a
lower discount.
Having put its product in the channels of trade, Klearflax was held
to be disabled thereafter from cutting off a distributor which had
underbid it for sales to one of its own direct customers. While the
result may be explained in terms of judicial hostility to a manufacturer
who might be said to be profiteering on Government contracts in
time of war, the application of Section 2 to monopolization of the
business of a particular customer for a specialty product for which
there are many close substitutes is extreme. 7 This decision represents
frank and complete judicial intervention on the side of the buyer, at
least where the buyer is dealing in turn with the Government. A
comparable situation would seem to arise wherever any dealer by clas-
sification or otherwise, or any competitor of the seller, is excluded from
any particular line of business in any product for which a perceptible
consumer 'demand based on advertising or distinctive quality has been
developed. 8 Appropriately, this decision was ignored by the Supreme
67. The Government charged only a violation of Section 2. It appears from
the decision that the evidence might have supported a finding of violation of Section
1 on familiar group boycott principles. The court at one point in its decision ob-
served that in addition to refusing itself to sell to Floor Products, Klearflax ob-
tained "the cooperation of the other distributors so that they would not sell-Floor
Products." Id. at 40.
68. For example, Judge Frank dissenting in Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge
Distributing Co., 189 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1951), suggested that the fact that an ex-
clusive agent "had a monopoly .. . of the right to make sales to wholesalers in
Massachusetts of a special brand of imported whiskey" was relevant to the legality
of a contract under which he agreed "to refuse to sell further supplies of that
monopolized brand to other wholesalers in the state." Id. at 924-25. A view more
consonant with business realities is that of Judge Chesnut in Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix
Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1938), where in dismissing a complaint brought
by a distributor cut off from supplies, he observed: "Every manufacturer has naturally
a complete monopoly of his particular product especially when sold under his own
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Court until it was cited in Mr. Justice Clark's essay on refusals to sell
in the Times-Picayune decision. 9
The question of the application of Section 2 to refusals to sell
has recently been before the Supreme Court in the Lorain Jour-
nal 7I and Times-Picayune cases. Both of these cases involved refusals
to sell which had the effect, like exclusive dealing and tie-in sales,
of restraining trade between customers and the seller's competitors.
In Lorain Journal, Mr. Justice Burton, for an unanimous Court,
held that the Journal's policy of refusing to sell newspaper advertising to
concerns which advertised on a radio station in a neighboring town con-
stituted an unlawful attempt to monopolize under Section 2. The Jour-
nal was a local newspaper, selling about 13,000 copies daily in Lorain
and reaching 99 per cent of Lorain's families. The Court stressed the
importance of surrounding circumstances which established the Journal
as "an indispensable medium of advertising for many Lorain con-
cerns." 71 The district court had found that the purpose and intent of the
Journal's refusals to sell "was to destroy the broadcasting company." 72
The Journal's policy, moreover, "often amounted to an effective prohibi-
tion of the use of" the local radio station for similar advertising pur-
poses.73 Admitting the "general right" of a private business concern
to refuse to sell, the Court held that this right was no defense for its
"exercise as a purposeful means of monopolizing interstate commerce
is prohibited by the Sherman Act." 7"
In the Times-Picayune case, the Supreme Court had before it
an appeal from the district court's conclusion that Section 2 had been
violated:
"Defendants . . . by the use of the unit rate device, at-
tempted to monopolize that' segment of the afternoon newspaper
general and classified advertising field which was represented by
those advertisers who also required morning newspaper space
and who could not because of budgetary limitations or financial
inability purchase space in both afternoon newspapers. This was
clearly an attempt to monopolize a part of trade or commerce
among the several states, within the meaning of the Statute." '
private brands, and no private controversy with a distributor could legally tend to
increase that type of a natural monopoly. The Sherman Act is, therefore, clearly
not really involved." Id. at 828.
69. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953).
70. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); see Note, 66
HRv. L. Rsv. 89, 137 (1952).
71. Lorain Journal Co. v United States, 342 U.S. 143, 152 (1951).
72. Id. at 149. The Supreme Court adopted this finding. Id. at 154.
73. Id. at 153.
74. Id. at 155.
75. United States v. Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 105 F. Supp. 670, 681
(E.D. La. 1952), rev'd, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
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1
The Supreme Court noted that the offense of attempt to monop-
olize under Section 2 requires a showing of specific intent to destroy
competition or build monopoly. It held that the charge failed since
the unit rate was predominantly motivated "by legitimate business
aims." 7' The Court adverted to the fact that at the time the unit rate
was adopted, a Times-Picayune competitor, which then published morn-
ing and afternoon papers, also employed a unit rate, that the unit rate
reduced overhead costs and permitted Times-Picayune better to com-
pete for national display advertising, and to the failure of the Govern-
ment to prove its charges of monopolistic design. It distinguished the
Lorain Journal case on the ground that there the single newspaper's
refusal to sell space to advertisers who advertised on the local radio
station manifested "bold, relentless, and predatory commercial be-
havior." The Court's emphasis on specific intent suggests that it re-
garded this as controlling on the Section 2 issue, even though the Court
considered that Times-Picayune did not enjoy a "dominant" position
in the relevant market-which it considered to be the newspaper ad-
vertising market in New Orleans including both morning and after-
noon papers.
77
Another aspect of the Section 2 problem arises wherever a seller
of product A competes with his customers in the sale of product B,
in the manufacture of which product A is required. This is a common
problem in the case of vertically integrated firms which manufacture and
sell both raw materials and products made from those materials.71 It
arises in a pronounced form when supplies of product A are short or
when competition in product B is severe. It will be apparent that any
vendor of a product or raw material, for which there are no satisfactory
substitutes available on the market at any given time, has the power,
at least in the short run, to control competition from his customers
by reducing, cutting off or pricing their supplies so as to limit their
76. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 622 (1953).
77. Mr. Justice Burton, who had written the opinion in Lorain Journal, wrote a.
dissenting opinion in which Justices Black, Douglas and Minton joined. Id. at 628.
The dissenters believed that, since the Times-Picayune enjoyed a "distinct, conceded
and complete monopoly of access to the morning newspaper readers in the New
Orleans area," its refusal to sell advertising in its morning paper except in combina-
tion with its evening paper violated the Sherman Act. While not expressly so
stating, the dissenters appear to have considered that the unit contracts violated § 1
as contracts in restraint of trade under International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392 (1947), or that Times-Picayune's refusal to sell advertising in the morning
paper alone constituted a use of its strategic position in the morning market "to
gain a competitive advantage" unlawful' under the monopolization provisions of § 2,
see United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948), or both.
78. See FTC STAPr REPoRT, MONOPousTIc PRAMcTCES AND SamAL BusinEss 39
et seq. (1952).
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ability to compete. Unless competitor-customers enjoy a special status
by virtue of their being competitors, one would expect that they would
stand in the same position as any other customers of the seller.
The classic example of antitrust violation in this area is the so-
called "price squeeze" of the aluminum products industry.79 Alcoa
was the only United States manufacturer of virgin ingot aluminum.
It sold ingot to fabricators engaged in rolling sheet aluminum.
Alcoa itself also engaged in rolling sheet aluminum and selling
it in competition with such fabricators. The prices at which it
sold the ingot and its own sheet aluminum had been such as to leave
an insufficient "spread" to permit the other fabricators to make a living
profit. The Second Circuit in 1945 found that the ingot price was
higher than a "fair price." The price squeeze was then itself 80 an
"unlawful exercise of Alcoa's power," at least after Alcoa had been put
on notice of the fabricators' complaints. In the circumstances of this
case, there could be no doubt as to the economic consequences of Alcoa's
sales policy. Indeed, the record showed that four out of eight com-
peting fabricators had gone out of business during the period of the
alleged price squeeze.
A similar element was involved in the Klearflax case."' Klear-
flax sold both finished rugs and rolls of linen rug material to distribu-
tors who cut the rolls into rug sizes as ordered by dealers and bound
and fringed the edges, and to jobbers who purchased only the finished
line of floor covering material. Consequently, the demotion of a dis-
tributor to the status of jobber, in addition to depriving it of the dis-
tributors' discount, deprived it of an opportunity to participate in the
cut-order phase of the business. The court adverted to this additional
fact in finding that Klearflax had effectively removed the offending dis-
tributor from competition for Government business in violation of
Section 2 .'
79. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945);
Baush Machine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 72 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.
1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 589 (1934).
80. The court said it did not consider Alcoals pricing of ingot to fabricators
"as part of the reasoning by which we conclude that the monopoly was unlawful."
Moreover, it accepted the trial court's finding that it "was not part of an attempt
to monopolize the 'sheet' market." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F2d 416, 438 (2d Cir. 1945).
81. United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn.
1945).
82. Id. at 40. For additional discussion of Klearflax, see text at note 66 .upra
See also Martin v. American Home Products Corp., 94 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y.
1950) (court denied motion to strike for failure to state a claim allegations in the
complaint that defendant, on learning of profits to be made from a penicillin cattle
remedy manufactured by plaintiff, one of its customers, undertook the manufacture
of a competing remedy and thereafter refused to sell penicillin to plaintiff).
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Two recent lower court decisions have inquired into the ultimate
question whether Section 2 may impose on a seller, who enjoys a
monopolistic position in any market, what in practical effect amounts
to a duty not to refuse to sell.
An attempt by the Government to spell out a violation of Section
2 by the largest seller of a commodity who refused to sell that com-
modity except to selected customers failed in the recent "cellophane"
case." The Government charged duPont with monopolizing, attempt-
ing to monopolize and conspiring to monopolize trade in cellophane.
One phase of the case was that duPont's selective converter policy,
i.e., its refusal to sell bulk cellophane for manufacture into bags,
wrappers, etc., to all converters who wished to buy from duPont, "was
done to promote and maintain a monopolistic position." 8 The dis-
trict court, however, concluded otherwise:
"That program is conceded to be legal, for it entailed little
more than duPont's wholly independent and lawful exercise of
its undisputed rights to select the persons to whom it would
sell. . .. DuPont chose to sell through a limited but steadily
expanding number of converters, rather than by offering its goods
to converters generally. In promoting its new and high-priced
material, it concluded this would enable it to select concerns who
were interested in promoting cellophane and would encourage
these concerns to give their best efforts to the distribution of cello-
phane." "
Nor did the fact that duPont formerly had exclusive contracts
with some of its converters change the situation. The court noted
that these exclusive contracts were one-year contracts, terminable by
either party on 30-days' notice-and that in fact the converters had
shifted back and forth between duPont and Sylvania, a second manu-
facturer of cellophane. The court concluded, therefore, that the volume
of duPont's sales to converters was due not to monopoly but "to the
superior quality of duPont cellophane, better service, and creative
selling." 86 More generally, the court expressed its difficulty with this
phase of the case as follows:
"Plaintiff's position appears to be since duPont had a sub-
stantial percentage of cellophane production, any distribution plan
adopted would have been improper and that its only recourse was
83. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del.
1953), appeal pending, Sup. Ct., No. 162, Oct. Term 1954.
84. Id. at 229.
85. Ibid.
86. Id. at 230.
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to sit back and wait for people to come to its plant and take away
cellophane. DuPont had to sell the goods it made. It had to
adopt a plan of distribution." 87
The ultimate position on behalf of a duty to sell under Section 2
was perhaps reached by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
when, in a suit by a disappointed buyer-competitor, it considered the
plaintiff's burden of proof satisfied once the seller's position as a latent
monopolist was shown.
In Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Building, Inc.,88
a circuit court articulated what in practical effect is a duty on the
part of a seller to justify a refusal to sell to a buyer-competitor to
escape violation of Section 2. Defendant corporation operated a build-
ing along the railroad tracks which served as a produce market where
the Providence, R. I., car-lot wholesale fruit and vegetable trade was
concentrated. Car-lot wholesaler tenants of the building were among
the stockholders of defendant corporation. All the leases contained
a covenant under which the lessee agreed not to "transfer or permit to
be transferred any interest in the business" without permission of de-
fendant. Owing to financial difficulties, plaintiff's stock was trans-
ferred to a "potentially lower priced" Boston firm; permission of the
defendant was not obtained. Thereafter, defendant refused to renew
plaintiff's lease.
Plaintiff sued under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and
the district court found for defendants. The First Circuit reversed.
The finite limitations of the building had "thrust monopoly power upon
the defendants," 89 and defendants had ousted plaintiff "at the very
moment of his affiliation with a potentially lower priced outsider." "
The conjunction of power and motive to exclude with an exclusion not
justified by reasonable business requirements,9 the court said, "estab-
87. Id. at 229. Other attempts to make out a violation of § 2 where the cus-
tomer refused supplies was not in competition with the seller have similarly failed.
E.g., Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 155 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1946); Arthur v. Kraft-
Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1938).
88. 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952), 101 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 550 (1953).
89. Id. at 487. The Court accepted the finding of the district court that duplicate
physical facilities could be constructed elsewhere along the New Haven tracks, but
regarded this as insufficient to "destroy the illegality of the asserted monopoliza-
tion." Id. at 488.
90. Ibid.
91. The court suggested as acceptable justification "lack of available space,
financial unsoundness, or possibly low business or ethical standards." Id. at 487.
These justifications of refusal to rent space were subsequently recognized in a
consent judgment entered in a Sherman Act case brought by the Government. See
United States v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 1954 Trade Cas. 1 67,872,
Part IV (A).
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lishes a prima facie case of the purpose to monopolize." 92 Since de-
fendant had failed "to come forward with some business justification,"
the court held that a violation of the Sherman Act had been made out."3
The Section 2 cases demonstrate the versatility of the Sherman
Act in reaching refusals to deal of economic significance by individual
sellers or buyers. Thus the refusal to deal may constitute an unlawful
use of monopoly power subject to attack under the monopolization
provision of Section 2. This was the basis of Judge Hand's ruling
with respect to the price squeeze in the Alcoa case and of the decision
in the Gamco case. The possible scope of this doctrine is suggested
by the Gamco case and by Mr. Justice Douglas' statement in United
States v. Griffith, " quoted in both Lorain Journal and Times-Picayune,
that the owner of the only theatre in a particular town may violate
the monopolization provisions of Section 2 when he uses that "stra-
tegic position" "to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive ad-
vantage, or to destroy a competitor." " If this be the law, inasmuch
as the Griffith case also held that specific intent is no longer an element
of the offense of monopolization under Section 2, one need only define
the relevant field of monopoly to fit the particular case in order to bring
a refusal to deal within the ambit of activity subject to challenge under
Section 2.
Secondly, the refusal to deal may constitute an attempt to mo-
nopolize where accompanied by evidence of a specific intent to accom-
plish the forbidden results. This was the situation in the Lorain
Journal and Klearflax cases. The ingenuity of the. courts in defining
92. Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484, 488
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
93. Id. at 489. The Gamco decision, by placing the burden of justification on the
seller who discontinues relations with a customer, misconceives the nature of a refusal
to sell. The result, however, is not so much to be criticized as the route followed by the
court. The court's decision might better have been framed in terms of a conspiracy
among competing wholesalers to monopolize the wholesale fruit and vegetable business
of Providence by excluding competition deemed undesirable. United States v. Terminal
R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); American Federation of Tobacco
Growers, Inc. v. Neal, 183 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1950) ; United States v. Tarpon Springs
Sponge Exchange, 142 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1944) ; United States v. New England Fish
Exchange, 258 Fed. 732 (D. Mass. 1919). Cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1 (1945). The Antitrust Division subsequently filed a complaint against the
Providence Fruit & Produce Building, Inc.-, and certain tenants of the building charg-
ing a conspiracy to restrain and monopolize trade in fruit and vegetable produce. See
CCH 1953 TRADE REG. REP. 166,067; 1954 Trade Cas. 168,872 (consent judgment).
The court of appeals in the Gamco case intimated this route was available but chose
not to overturn a trial court finding of no conspiracy. Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit
& Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484, 488-89 (1st Cir. 1952). It is to be regretted
that the Supreme Court cited the Gamco decision without indicating disapproval in
Times-Picayune v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 n.29 (1953).
94. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
95. Id. at 106, 107.
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the relevant market in these cases to fit the circumstances before
them indicates the further scope of Section 2 as a route to judicial
control over refusals to deal where a specific intent to exclude is shown.
Thus, the legality of a unilateral refusal to deal under Section
2 turns on the question whether the "market" occupied by the one who
refuses to deal or the "market" from which one who refuses to deal
attempts to exclude another is such as to invoke the monopoly pro-
hibitions of the Act. It has been said that the appropriate market is
the "area of effective competition" " within which the trader concerned
operates. This in turn depends upon "discovering patterns of trade
which are followed in practice," 9T in terms of both the products
affected by the conduct, including a consideration of substitutes and
potential competition, and the geographical area concerned. This
market question is ably discussed in the recent report of the Attorney
General's Committee, 98 and will not be explored in this Article. It
is our purpose here only to suggest the relation between the develop-
ment of the market concept under Section 2 and one's freedom to re-
fuse to deal. For such purposes, the policy question becomes this:
What is that "monopoly" which so offends the public interest in market
freedom as to warrant federal control of the trade freedom of the person
who seeks or enjoys that "monopoly?" This is, of course, but one facet
on the field of monopoly problem under Section 2.
At one extreme, from the perspective of this study, we may con-
fidently suggest that recognition of the public interest in liberty of con-
tract requires that "monopoly" for Sherman Act purposes consists of
something more than the power to deny something to a buyer to his
disadvantage by refusing to deal with him. Of course, the power to
injure a buyer by refusing to deal implies the lack of alternative sources
of supplies to the buyer in question, for if perfect substitutes were avail-
able the refusal of any particular supplier to sell would be a matter of
indifference to the buyer. In an economic sense, therefore, the power
to disadvantage a buyer by refusing to deal is itself an indicia of what
is called monopoly power. But to accept such a showing as sufficient
to invoke the prohibitions of the monopoly provisions of the Sherman
Act would be to use an act founded on the philosophy that it is in the
public interest to preserve freedom of trade, to destroy that freedom
throughout a large sector of the economy without analysis of the
broader economic and political implications of such destruction.
96. Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1949).
97. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
98. REPoRT OF Arr'Y GEN.'s Comm. 44 et seq. See further Note, The Market:
A Concept it Anti-Truest, 54 COL. L. REv. 580 (1954).
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At the other extreme are situations such as that presented by
the "price squeeze" aspects of the Alcoa case. It is patently consistent
with our traditions of market freedom that a firm in the position of
Alcoa in the early 1930's should be precluded by the antitrust laws
from controlling competition by pricing supplies so as to eliminate
competition from customer-competitors.
Between these poles lie the cases discussed above. While the
writer has considerable difficulty, for example, with the idea that the
"monopoly" enjoyed by the only manufacturer of linen rugs or the
owner of a building, or the "market" represented by the requirements
of the Government or any other single customer should be controlling
in determining the legality under Section 2 of a refusal to deal, it
may be noted that the cases where violations of Section 2 have been
found each involved what might be characterized as predatory refusals
to deal successfully aimed at directly eliminating competition with the
seller.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act left to the courts the determination
of the point at which freedom to trade should give way to federal con-
trol over the freedom of individuals not to trade. "Monopoly is
the talismanic word. An individual's freedom not to trade is unquali-
fied, regardless of motive, so long as he neither seeks nor enjoys a
"monopoly." The cases reviewed above indicate that the courts are
groping for an appropriate rationale of the monopoly provisions of
the Sherman Act which, while limiting the freedom of a trader unduly
to exploit trade advantages stemming from his market position, will
assure the preservation of his essential freedom to develop his business,
including his supplier and customer relationships, in accordance with
his personal business judgment.
CONCERTED REFUSAL TO DEAL
Concerted refusals to deal include both refusals designed to coerce
or exclude third parties, commonly called group boycotts, and refusals
which stem from contractual obligations or joint ventures which affect
third parties only indirectly. It is important to distinguish the two
situations inasmuch as the courts have properly allowed greater scope
for group action which falls within the latter category.
Concerted Refusal to Deal Intended to Coerce Conduct of Third Parties
or to Secure Their Removal from Competition
Throughout the history of the Sherman Act, the courts have had
little difficulty in finding unreasonable restraints of trade in agree-
ments among competitors, at any level of distribution, designed to
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coerce those subject to a boycott to accede to the action or inaction
desired by the group or to exclude them from competition. 9  The
leading case involving commercial boycotts has long been Eastern
States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States,' which involved
a scheme to deter wholesale dealers from selling directly to customers
of retailers through circulation to the member retailers of a list of
offending wholesalers. Although the members of the association had
not expressly agreed to refrain from dealing with the listed whole-
salers and there was no penalty for failure to do so, it was conceded
by defendants that the circulation of this information had the natural
tendency to cause retailers receiving the reports to refuse to buy from
the listed concerns.
The Court had no difficulty in inferring a conspiracy to boycott.
In holding that this agreement went beyond the "normal and usual
agreements in aid of trade and commerce which may be found not to
be within the act," '' the Court emphasized that the group action
there involved placed involuntary restraints on the buying oppor-
tunities of strangers to the agreement. In disposing of the argument
that the conduct was reasonably necessary for the protection of the
retail trade and promotion of the public welfare in providing retail
facilities, the Court ruled that the Sherman Act was designed to pre-
vent resort to practices which unduly restrained trade and added that
"private choice of means must yield to the national authority thus
exerted." "02 The Court did not doubt that a retail dealer could stop
dealing with a wholesaler for reason sufficient to himself, but con-
sidered that, when he joined with others to do this, the act became
unlawful under the Sherman Act.
The same reasoning has been echoed in subsequent decisions
where the Court declared unlawful agreements among dominant groups
of motion picture distributors not to supply films to an exhibitor unless
he dealt with all the distributors,' 3 not to license pictures except under
a standard form contract which included a provision for the arbitra-
tion of all disputes under the contract," 4 or not to lease films to
99. See generally, Note, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1136-40 (1949); Kirkpatrick, Com-
mnercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Shermarn Act, 10 GEo. WAsH. L. Rxv.
302 (1942).
100. 234 U.S. 600 (1914). Prior group boycott cases under the Sherman Act
include Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S.
274 (1908); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912).
101. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600,
612 (1914).
102. Id. at 613.
103. Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923).
104. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
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theaters which had changed hands, unless the new owner assumed the
obligations of the former owners to the distributors or deposited with
the lessor in advance cash security as specified by the distributors. 10 5
Judicial abhorrence of concerted refusal to deal intended to coerce
action by third parties is further reflected in decisions outlawing con-
certed refusals to sell by members of cooperatives enjoying limited
exemptions under the antitrust laws." 6
On the other hand, during the same period the courts indicated
that concerted refusal to deal, even by a dominant group, might be
justifiable where in aid of the payment of bills due,0 7 the avoidance of
relationships illegal in themselves 108 and the elimination of trade
abuses.'0 9 In Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States,"' Chief Justice
Hughes, in a frequently-quoted passage, made reference to this area
when he stated:
"Designed to frustrate unreasonable restraints, they [the pro-
hibitions of the Sherman Act] do not prevent the adoption of
reasonable means to protect interstate commerce from destructive
or injurious practices and to promote competition upon a sound
basis. Voluntary action to end abuses and to foster fair competi-
tive opportunities in the public interest may be more effective
than legal processes. And co-operative endeavor may appropri-
ately have wider objectives than merely the removal of evils which
are infractions of positive law." "'
The significance of the cases upholding group action has, however,
been limited by the decision of the Supreme Court in Fashion Origi-
nators' Guild v. FTC." There the Supreme Court applied the rule
forbidding group boycotts which unreasonably restrain trade to con-
demn group action to control style piracy-an unethical, if not tortious
practice. The Fashion Originators' Guild sought to destroy competi-
tion from manufacturers who pirated designs of Guild members by
105. United States v. First Nat. Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930).
106. Hinton v. Columbia River Packers Ass'n, Inc., 131 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1942)
(refusal by cooperative formed under Fisheries Cooperative Marketing Act, 48
STAT. 1213-14 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 521, 522 (1952), to sell fish to packer
who refused to agree not to purchase fish from non-members of cooperative held un-
lawful) ; Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Industries, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal.
1941).
107. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 394 n.1 (1905) ; United States
v. Fur Dressers' & Fur Dyers Ass'n, 5 F.2d 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1925); see Cement
Manufacturers Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 604 (1925).
108. United States v. American Livestock Commission Co., 279 U.S. 435, 438
(1929).
109. Butterick Publishing Co. v. FTC, 85 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 1936).
110. 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
111. Id. at 597-98.
112. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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refusing to sell to retailers who sold such copied garments. The
scheme operated through the circulation of lists of noncooperating re-
tailers to whom no sales were to be made by Guild members.
In holding the practice unlawful, the Court noted that the Guild
occupied a "commanding position" in its line of business 11 and fur-
ther held that it was not error for the Federal Trade Commission to
refuse to hear much of the evidence offered on the reasonableness of
the scheme to protect the trade against the "devastating evils" grow-
ing from the pirating of original designs. The reasonableness of the
methods was "no more material than would be the reasonableness of
the prices fixed by unlawful combination." "'
The distinguishing feature of the group boycott cases is group
action to coerce third parties to conform to the pattern of conduct
desired by the group or to secure their removal from competition."'
The essential combination may be horizontal 116 or vertical.'17  Such
action offends the concept of a free market because it places involuntary
restraints on the trading opportunities of strangers to the group. In
holding such concerted refusals to deal unlawful, the courts have focused
on the means used-the group boycott-noting that the objective of the
group itself may be lawful and the" effect not unlawful if accomplished
by an individual not acting in concert with others.
The harsh judicial attitude toward group boycott stems partly
from the assumption that group action directed against individuals in-
volves an inherent imbalance in economic power,"' which may or
113. In 1936, Guild members sold more than 38%' of all women's garments whole-
saling at $6.75 and up and more than 60% of those selling at $10.75 and above.
114. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467, 468 (1941). The
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in a treble damage action, had previously
upheld the group boycott organized by the Guild as reasonably designed to deter
admitted trade abuses. The court found no threat of monopoly, noting that dresses
in all price ranges were available from manufacturers who were not members of the
Guild and that dresses of Guild members could have been obtained by cooperating.
Wm. Filene Sons Co. v. Fashion Originators' Guild, 90 F2d 556 (1st Cir. 1937).
115. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 100-14 supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (combined refusal to sell to dealer
who failed to observe suggested maximum resale prices) ; United States v. Frankfort
Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945); Millinery Creator's Guild, Inc. v. FTC,
312 U.S. 469 (1941); William G6ldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F.2d
738 (3d Cir. 1945), 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948);
Johnson v. J. H. Yost Lumber Co., 117 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1941); Vitagraph, Inc. v.
Perelman, 95 F.2d 142- (3d Cir. 1936), cert, denied 305 U.S. 610 (1938); United
States v. Minneapolis Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 99 F. Supp. 75 (D. Minn. 1951),
appeal di.smissed, 207 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1953); United States v. Waltham Watch
Co., 47 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
116. See cases cited in notes 100-05 supra.
117. E.g., Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 297 Fed. 791 (2d Cir. 1924)
(refusal by Victor and cooperating dealers to sell to May's at other than retail
prices); United States v. Waltham Watch Co., 47 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1942)
(refusal by watch manufacturer and cooperating jobbers and retailers to sell to other
than approved outlets).
118. See, e.g., Binderup v. Pathe Exchange; Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 311-12 (1923);
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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may not be true depending on the relative market position of the in-
dividual and the group considered as a unit, and partly in the fact that a
group boycott can easily be identified as a practice which imposes a
direct restraint on the freedom of others to trade and, as a practical
matter, can be easily remedied by injunction. For a justification
of group boycotts, one can look only to the specific group interest in
self-protection in the particular case, not to the broad public interest
in a free market; the public interest in preserving the freedom of a
person to develop business relations as he likes, which is invoked to
support cases concerned with unilateral refusals to deal, is not here in
issue. Limitations on group boycotts are designed to protect that very
freedom of the individual.
One may question whether there are any circumstances, outside of
a possible de minimis area,-19 where the group boycott should be ac-
cepted as a "reasonable means to protect interstate commerce from
destructive or injurious practices." 120 The most plausible justifica-
tions for its use are perhaps in aid of reasonable credit provisions and
the avoidance of relationships illegal in themselves. But even here
the case for permitting group boycott is not commanding. The public
interest may better be served by leaving to each trader individually
the decision whether to deal with any particular person whose trade
practices offend standards of conduct conventionally accepted by the
business of which he is a part. The possible injury to competition
from private regulation of trade outweighs what interest there might
be in reserving to the group freedom under the antitrust laws to set up
private means of self-protection enforced through group boycott.
Concerted Refusals to Deal Involving the Acceptance of Limitations
on Individual Freedom to Deal Not Intended to Coerce Action
by Third Parties or to Secure Their Removal from the Market
When the element of purpose to coerce the trade policy of third
parties or to secure their removal from competition is absent, the policy
question raised by agreements under which the parties mutually limit
their own freedom to deal with outsiders becomes more difficult, and
the courts have appropriately outlined wider limits before declaring
such agreements illegal.
There are many "normal and usual agreements in aid of trade
and commerce," to use the Eastern States language, which involve the
acceptance by the parties of limitations on their freedom individually
119. Cf., Ruddy Brook Clothes, Inc. v. British Foreign Marine Ins. Co., 195
F2d 86, 89-90 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 816 (1952).
120. See text at note 111 supra.
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to deal with others. Restrictions of the sort upheld at common law
on the trade activities of a vendor of a business ancillary to its sale
is one such form of agreement. Requirements contracts, exclusive
dealing contracts and contracts involving exclusive territories all in-
volve limitations on the freedom of one or more of the parties to do
business with others.
Similarly, trade associations which limit the availability of their
services to membersY21 or exchanges which establish rules for the
government of the members of the exchange, 2 2 or terminal facilities
established cooperatively by those interested in the development of the
facilities "3 or joint sales agencies wherein the members limit their
right to sell except through the joint agency " all involve horizontal
agreements which limit the freedom of the participants to deal with
outsiders.
Because all of these situations involve an agreement between two
or more persons under which one or more of them agree not to deal
with third persons and for that reason foreclose a part of the market
to such third persons, they are all subject to scrutiny under the anti-
trust laws. But in the ordinary case these do not involve combining
for the primary purpose of coercing or excluding; rather they involve
combinations of two or more persons to further directly the business
of the parties to the agreement, and the effect on third parties and on
competition is indirect. The issue in these cases is not the existence
or nonexistence of concerted refusal to deal, but rather whether the
purpose and effect of the operation of the contract, association, exchange
or joint sales agency was such as unreasonably to exclude outsiders
from participation in the trade in question. The principle of the group
boycott cases-that it is prima facie unreasonable for a dominant group
to combine to coerce-is not here applicable.
The point requires emphasis because of the confusion introduced
by the Associated Press " case and the subsequent dicta of the Su-
preme Court in the Columbia Steel m and Times-Picayune 11 cases.
In Columbia Steel, the Supreme Court cited Associated Press together
with three group boycott cases 12 for the proposition that where a
121. E.g., Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
122. E.g., Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
123. See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 405
(1912).
124. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
125. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
126. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948).
127. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953).
128. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); Montague
& Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
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complaint charges that the defendants "have concertedly refused to
deal with non-members of an association . . then the amount of
commerce involved is immaterial because such restraints are illegal
per se." " In Times-Picayune, the Court carried the suggestion that
any agreement involving limitations on the freedom of the parties to
deal with others was per se unlawful still further, when it said, citing
Associated Press, that "group boycotts, or concerted refusals to deal,
clearly run afoul of § 1." 130 Of course, the use of the words "concerted
refusals to deal" in conjunction with "group boycotts" suggests action
directed at outsiders and might be so limited. But the Court's citation
of Associated Press leaves open the suggestion that the antitrust con-
sequence of association is an automatic obligation to make the product
of the association available to all who seek to buy or otherwise par-
ticipate.
The Associated Press case involved the legality of the by-laws of
AP, which placed restrictions on the admission to membership of
applicants serving the same area as any existing member, and other
by-laws forbidding AP members to sell news to nonmembers. The
latter by-laws involved, by definition, a concerted refusal to deal.
In analyzing the issues, Judge Learned Hand, for a three-judge
district court, cited the group boycott cases in suggesting that "any
use by a combination of its economic power to force a third person
not to deal with another whom the combination wishes to coerce" is
unlawful as such, but properly noted that the case before him fell
outside this area." 1 The element of combining to coerce being absent,
the court was required to weigh the advantages gained by the com-
bination through their association for the collection and dissemination
of news against the injury done to the public-that is, to appraise the
significance of the restraint in the context of the particular industry
against the standards of reasonableness which have developed under
the Sherman Act. Judge Hand appraised the dominant position of AP
in the news-gathering field and concluded that the effect of the by-
laws restricting membership in AP was to restrain trade unreasonably.
The by-laws restricting sale of spot news to nonmembers "taken by
themselves, and apart from the restrictions on membership," accord-
ing to the court, "would be valid." Such agreements not to deal with
outsiders were reasonable and ancillary to the main lawful purpose
of A.'
129. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522-23 (1948).
130. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953).
131. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y.
1943).
132. Id. at 373-74.
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A majority of the Supreme Court agreed with the district court
that the AP arrangement resulted in an unlawful restraint of trade.
The Supreme Court, however, shifted the emphasis from the restric-
tions on membership to the refusal to deal with outsiders. The Court
relied heavily on the group boycott cases. It did not distinguish them
in principle, but wove them into an opinion grounded on the dominant
position of AP in the news-gathering field and the effect of the by-laws
in limiting the competitive opportunities of nonmembers.
The Court's characterization of the AP set-up as "designed to
stifle competition" 133 was drawn by inference from the by-laws them-
selves. Accordingly, its reliance on the group boycott cases was mis-
leading. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Murphy in his dissent, the
gi~oup boycott cases were "relevant only to a situation where there is
some element of coercion or unfairness present," 13' which does not
appear to have been shown in the Associated Press case.
It is a short step from the Court's use of the group boycott cases
in Associated Press to its dictum in the Columbia Steel case, which
opens the door to per se illegality of any business agreement involving
commitments not to deal with third parties. The voluntary acceptance
of limitations on one's own freedom to deal with others dissociated from
a purpose to coerce or to exclude is not necessarily unlawful; if ade-
quate scope is to be given to the requirements of trade and the produc-
tive capabilities of group activities, the purpose and effect of such a
contract or combination ought to be examined in the context of its
operation.1 35 Nothing in the Associated Press case requires a contrary
interpretation of the Sherman Act. This is an area where the public
interest requires careful regard for the balancing of competing interests
within the framework of the rule of reason.138
PoLIcY ALTERNATIVES
The courts have been consistently effective in striking down trade
restraints implemented in important measure by refusals to deal and
threats to refuse to deal. This is the basis of the recommendation of
the Attorney General's Committee against any revision of the antitrust
133. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19 (1945).
134. Id. at 58.
135. Cf. Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 127 F. Supp. 286,
299-301 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
136. See United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 336
(1952), where the Court intimated that a "concerted refusal to deal" by Oregon
physicians with private health associations might come within the permissible area
of group activity because "there are ethical considerations where the historic direct
relationship between patient and physican is involved which are quite different than
the usual considerations prevailing in ordinary commercial matters."
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laws designed to modify their impact on refusals to deal. 137  Con-
certed refusals to deal if designed to coerce or exclude third parties
are themselves unlawful restraints.:3 Resale price maintenance or
unlawful exclusive dealing schemes enforced by systematic refusals
to sell are reached under Section 1 of the Sherman Act wherever there
is evidence of agreement or combination with cooperating dealers.' 3
Refusals to sell to dealers who handle or take on competing lines may
be relevant evidence of an unlawful condition or understanding in
sales to others which may be reached under Section 3 of the Clayton
Act.'40 Exploitation of a monopoly position to restrain or prevent
competition in any market by refusals to deal may be controlled under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 4 ' Provided there is present the requi-
site elements of agreement, understanding, combination, or monopoly
to make out a violation of the Sherman Act or Section 3 of the Clay-
ton Act, schemes employing refusals to deal may be controlled under
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.' In general, how-
ever, except as restraint of trade or monopoly independent of the refusal
may be shown, a person conducting an entirely private business is free
to refuse to deal with any person for any reason. The pattern of conduct
of which it forms a part, not the refusal to deal, is the relevant object
of antitrust inquiry.
These conclusions may be stated as settled law. More, however,
should be said about refusals to deal by individual firms.
Wherever there is specific consumer demand for the product con-
cerned, an indication by a seller to his customers of his sales policy
may result in a market situation which is the economic equivalent of
sales-on-condition. In this day of studied product differentiation, this
will indeed be the case throughout a large segment of the economy.
The antitrust laws are concerned with economic realities, not with
conceptual niceties; they are aimed "at substance rather than form." '
Should not a court, when confronted with a situation which would be
unlawful if enforced by contract, strike it down under the antitrust laws
if it results from the trader's individual decision not to deal with the
customer or class of trade concerned? Should one be permitted to ac-
137. See REPORT oF ATr'Y GEN.'s Comm. 137.
138. See pp. 872-76 supra.
139. See pp. 851-62 supra.
140. See text at note 53 supra.
141. See pp. 862-72 supra.
142. E.g., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) ; FTC cases cited
in note 31 supra.
143. United States v. YelIQw Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947).
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complish indirectly that which is prohibited if done directly? Con-
sideration of the implications of this question nurtures the instinct in
antitrust lawyers to advise clients not to cut off customers who dis-
please them, except in the presence of the clearest sort of justification.
4 4
While the soundness of such advice as a practical matter is not
questioned, one must be careful not to lose sight of the nature of the
interests involved. In the Colgate case,'45 the Supreme Court had to
choose between infringing Colgate's freedom not to sell and permitting
Colgate to accomplish indirectly what all agreed could not be accom-
plished directly by agreement, express or implied. Since it considered
itself bound by the interpretation the district court had given to the
indictment-that no agreement was charged-it could not escape this
choice. Unanimously it held that no violation of the Sherman(Act
was charged: "The purpose of the Sherman Act is . . . to preserve
the right of freedom to trade." ' Subsequent cases involving refusals
to deal where antitrust violations were found do not detract from the
clarity of this decision; they reflect only an appropriate alertness on the
part of courts, when presented with a full record, to find that essential
agreement deemed missing in the Colgate indictment, in the entire
course of dealings revealed by the evidence.
There have been many approaches to the problem of reaching re-
fusals to deal by individual firms as such.
It was at one time suggested that trade abuses stemming from
the power of large trusts, by refusing to deal, to coerce resale price
maintenance, exclusive dealing, rebates and the like, might be con-
trolled under the general law through an extension of the law of com-
mon employments to businesses enjoying a virtual monopoly in their
line of commerce"" or to business generally.148  But this suggestion
did not find favor in the courts. It conflicted with the political and
economic philosophy of the times and aroused concern as to the possible
impact of the constitutional guarantees of private property as limiting
the classes of business which might be held to be affected with a public
144. See, e.g., Timberg, Selection of Customers in How To COMPLY WITH
AN=rrrausr LAws 117 (1954); Rifkind, Division of Territories in id. at 127;
Dean, Supervision of Selling, in id. at 218.
145. See pp. 851-53 supra.
146. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
147. Wyman, The Law of Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem,
17 HAgv. L. REv. 156-73, 217-47 (1904).
148. Adler, Business Jurisprudence, 28 HARV. L. Rmy. 135 (1914). The author
reviews the earliest cases and disputes the historical validity of the distinction be-
tween public and private callings. Public or common employments, he contends, were
all those in which a man undertakes to deal with persons indifferently for profit-
a characteristic of all business. The historical distinction lay in the private as dis-
tinguished from the public exercise of a trade.
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interest and therefore, under established constitutional doctrines, sub-
ject to public regulation.149
The Clayton Act had not been on the books a year when A. & P.
attempted to use Section 2, making unlawful discriminations in price
which substantially affect competition, to compel the Cream of Wheat
Company to sell to it.' 50 In the early 1920's the Federal Trade Com-
mission sought to control unilateral refusals to deal under Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act; but the courts, consistent with
the Colgate ruling, held that unless the course of dealing evidenced a
contract or combination in restraint, an attempt to monopolize or un-
lawful sales on condition, there was no violation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.:""
More recently advocates of greater control over unilateral re-
fusals to deal have looked hopefully toward new interpretations of con-
spiracy as that term is used in Section 1 of the Sherman Act.15
2
Significantly, the "intra-corporate" conspiracy doctrine has been
suggested and tested in cases involving refusals to deal. In situations
involving several corporate entities, agreements among the members
of the corporate family to refuse to deal have been held to violate
Section 1 .11 The Government, in two cases involving refusals to deal
by single firms, charged a violation of Section 1 in that the officers of
the corporation conspired to refuse to deal. In one case, the court
found it unnecessary to decide the issue; 154 in the other the Government
abandoned these charges after trial when it appeared that more. tra-
149. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876); Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 224- Fed. 566, 574-75 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 227 Fed.
46 (2d Cir. 1915); see also Dueber Watch-Case Mfg. Co. v. E. Howard Watch
& Clock Co., 66 Fed. 637, 645 (2d Cir. 1895).
150. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 224 Fed. 566
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir. 1915). See text beginning at pp. 849-51
supra.
151. E.g., FTC v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924); FTC v.
Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) ; FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920) ;
see REPORT OF ATr'y GEN.'s Comm. 136. But cf. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S.
683, 721 n.19 (1948) ("While we hold that the Commission's findings of combina-
tion were supported by evidence, that does not mean that existence of a 'combina-
tion' is an indispensable ingredient of an 'unfair method of competition' under the
[Federal] Trade Commission Act.").
152. See Kramer, Does Concerted Action Solely Between a Corporation and
Its Offlcers Acting on Its Behalf in Unreasonable Restraint of Interstate Commerce
Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act?, 11 FED. B.J. 130 (1951) ; Comment, 63 YALE
L.J. 372, 385-87 (1954); cf. Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILL.
L. RFxv. 743 (1950).
153. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951)
(§ 1, refusal to sell to dealer who did not observe maximum prices) ; United States
v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941) (Q 1, criminal, refusal to sell
except in combination). Cf. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
593, 597-98, 606-07 (1951); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227
(1947) ; Note, 100 U. b PA. L. REv. 1006 (1952).
154. See United States v. Lorain Journal Co., 92 F. "Supp. 794, 799-800 (N.D.
Ohio 1950).
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ditional violations were made out. 5' A judicial test occurred, however,
in Nelson Radio and Supply Co. v. Motorola,15 when the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint where a Motorola distributor,
cut off from supplies, founded its Section 1 action upon an alleged
intra-corporate conspiracy.
The Motorola decision is to be welcomed and the result appro-
priately has received the endorsement of the Attorney General's Com-
mittee.' 5" If the conspiracy requirement should be read out of Sec-
tion 1, any firm which refused to sell to any person would do so at the
peril that the effect of the refusal would on suit by such person be found
unreasonably to have restrained trade. This is so, because under Sec-
tion 1 proof of specific intent to bring about the effect shown is not an
essential element of the offense. Such a result would not only ignore
the basic structure of the Sherman Act, wherein Congress reserved
controls over conduct of individual firms to monopoly situations covered
by Section 2, but also would erode, without analysis, that freedom for
the entrepreneur acting as an individual which historically has been one
of the most important sources of the competitive vigor of our economy.
Attempts to control unilateral refusals to sell have also been made
via the implied conspiracy doctrine where competing sellers have each
refused to sell to the same would-be buyer. No criticism is made of
those cases wherein the courts have implied the essential conspiracy
among the sellers but have required proof from surrounding business
circumstances of collaboration or knowing participation in the con-
spiracy to buttress the inference to be drawn from parallel refusals to
sell,158 and absent such proof have failed to find conspiracy. 5 ' One
court, however, intimated that a seller could not refuse to sell to a par-
ticular customer when he knew, or ought to have known, that his com-
petitors had previously refused or intended to refuse dealings with this
155. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626
(1953).
156. 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953) ; accord,
Marion County Co-op. Ass'n v. Carnation Co., 114 F. Supp. 58, 62-63 (W.D. Ark.
1953), aff'd, 214 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1954); Hershel California Fruit Products Co.
v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 1954 Trade Cas. 67,928 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
157. REPORT OF Ar'.x GEN.'S Comm. 31.
158. E.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) ; William
Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F.2d 738 (3d Cir. 1945), 164 F.2d 1021
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948); Vitagraph, Inc. v. Perelman, 95 F.2d
142 (3d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 610 (1938).
159. E.g., Windsor Theatre Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co., 189 F.2d 797 (4th
Cir. 1951); Dipson Theatres, Inc. v. Buffalo Theatres, Inc., 190 F.2d 951 (2d Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952); Johnson v. J. H. Yost Lumber Co., 117
F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1941); G. & P. Amusement Co. v. Regent Theatre Co., 107
F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Ohio 1952), aff'd, 216 F.2d 749 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
23 U.S.L. WEEK 3251 (U.S. April 12, 1955); Fanchon & Marco Inc. v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 215 F.2d 167 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1954).
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customer."'0 The case concerned an attempt by a drive-in theater to get
first run films. The responsible officials of the motion picture distribu-
tors concerned each testified that his decision not to license first run
films to the drive-in theater was grounded on his experience and the
economics of the business, and was made without any knowledge of
similar action on the part of the others. The court, however, rejected
this testimony despite the absence of any evidence to the contrary. "In
practical effect, consciously parallel business practices have taken the
place of the concept of meeting of the minds. . . . Present concert
of action, further proof of actual agreement among the defendants
is unnecessary.. ,, 1. 1 The court apparently thought that drive-ins
ought to be given a chance and found "the conscious parallel action
equals conspiracy" approach a handy route to this end. Happily, the
Supreme Court, in the Theatre Enterprises case, which involved in-
dividual refusals by several motion picture distributors to license first
run pictures to plaintiff, has since made it clear that "'conscious par-
allelism' has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act en-
tirely." 12 This relegates the evidentiary significance of a refusal to
sell to its proper role as a fact which may have a tendency to corroborate
other evidence from which the fact finder may infer agreement.
X The problem of the appropriate scope of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act in controlling unilateral refusals to deal by individual firms is more
difficult. The Section 2 cases have been rather fully discussed in this
Article because, in the writer's view, the proscriptions of Section 2 are
of cardinal importance in working out an appropriate accommodation
between the public interest in preserving trade freedom for the indi-
vidual business entity acting unilaterally and the public interest in
preserving essential market freedom for those with whom it deals.
Under the Sherman Act, this accommodation is to be worked out by
the courts. It in no sense involves a conflict between right and wrong;
the conflict is rather between rights of equal dignity. The federal
courts, responsive to the requirements of changing times, have long
since retreated from the notion that Spencerian laissez-faire economics
was embodied in the Sherman Act."" The perimeter of trade freedom
for the business entity acting unilaterally is an evolving one to be
worked out under the distinct legislative standards of Section 2.
160. Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff'd, 192 F.2d
579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952).
161. 94 F. Supp. at 419.
162. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S.
537, 541 (1954).
163. Cf. Mendelson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Process of Judicial Review,
103 U. oF PA. L. Ra,. 295 (1954).
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There are those, of course, who conceive public policy as requir-
ing a trader to deal with all on non-discriminatory terms and conditions.
The antitrust laws, flexible and with a tradition of growth, could be
made to serve this end; we have indicated the routes available and noted
the suggestions in recent decisions and writings which point in this
direction. But the antitrust laws should not, it is submitted, be so used.
The understandable search by enforcement agencies for universals
in the interest of simplified enforcement and the trend toward more
extensive coverage of the Sherman Act should not be permitted to
obscure the aims of the statute. We have shown that the courts
applying traditional conspiracy and monopoly doctrines have been
consistently effective in dealing with restraints of trade implemented
by refusals to deal without "destroying all liberty of contract" and
"causing the act to be at war with itself by annihilating the funda-
mental right of freedom to trade which, on the very face of the act, it
was enacted to preserve." ' Congress in enacting the Clayton Act
rejected a provision outlawing arbitrary refusals to sell as projecting it
into a field of legislation "untried, complicated and dangerous." " The
Supreme Court has steadfastly protected the entrepreneur's freedom to
deal and not to deal when that freedom has been attacked as such.
Unilateral refusals to deal where considerations of monopoly are not in-
volved are normal incidents of the enjoyment of that trade freedom
which has been a unique characteristic of our economic system. Re-
fusals to deal are not evil in themselves; suggestions that they are
and that it would be in the public interest to impose on ordinary private
business standards of conduct not unlike those imposed on public
utilities stem from political considerations separate and apart from
those underlying the antitrust laws. Frank recognition of this frees
antitrust analysis of situations involving refusals to deal from con-
siderations foreign to antitrust and leaves the presumption of legality
where, in the absence of some new expression of the legislative will, it
belongs, on the side of freedom of action for the individual trader.
164. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911).
165. The House bill, which was the forerunner of the Clayton Act, contained
a section making it unlawful for sellers of coal, oil, gas, and electricity "to refuse
arbitrarily to sell such products to a responsible person." H.R. 15,657, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. §3 (1914). In striking this provision as "unwise," the Senate referred
not only to its possibly doubtful constitutional validity as denying freedom of contract
to one of the parties, but also to the fact that it would project Congress "into a field
of legislation at once untried, complicated and dangerous." Ssa. REP. No. 698, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1914). Compare text at note 149 supra.
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